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egates should possess all information presented to the committee, 
be assumed there was no objection to its being circulated. 
The chairman said he feared it would not be possible to get all 
these reports circulated in time to be examined and discussed 
t11at afternoon, and if it was thought best the committee might 
adjourn until the next morning. 
Accordingly, the meeting ·was adjourned until Saturday, Jan-
uary 7, 1922, at 11 o'clock a. m. 
. , 
SEVENTEENTH MEETING-SATURDAY, JANUARY 7, 1922, 11 A.M. 
PRESENT. 
United States.-1\Jlr. :Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator 
Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by 
Mr. 'Vright, Mr. Clark. 
British Empire.-Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada) , 
Senator Pearce (for Australia). Accompanied by Sir l\faurice 
Hankey, Capt. Domvile, Mr. Mousley, Col. Day, Mr. Flint. 
France.-Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon. 
Accompanied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal. 
Mr. Pensot. 
Italy.-Senator Schanzer, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral 
Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count 
Pagliano, Col. ·Asinari di Bernezzo. 
Japan.-Admiral Baron Kato, Prince Tokugawa, Vice Admiral 
Kato, Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi, Mr. Shira-
tori, l\fr. Sugimura. 
The secretary general. Assisted by Mr. Cresson and 1\ir. Os-
borne. Mr. Camerlynck, interpreter. 
1. The seventeenth meeting of the Committee on the Limitation 
of Armament was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan Ameri-
can Union Building on Saturday, January 7, 1922, at 11 a. m. 
2. There were present: For the United States, Mr. Hughes, 
Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senatof Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, 
Admiral Coontz; .for the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, 
Sir Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert 
Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia) ; for 
France, 1\ir. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon; for 
Italy, Senafor Schanzer, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Acton; 
for .Japan, Admiral Baron Kato, Prince Tokugawa, Vice Admiral 
Kato, Capt. Uyeda. 
3. Secretaries and technical advisors were present as follows: 
For the United States, Mr. Wright,_ Mr. Clark; for the British 
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Empire, Sir 1\_'[aurice Hankey, Capt. Domvile, Mr. Mousley, Col. 
Day, l\Ir. Flint; for France, 1\ir. I(ammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. 
Odenl: hal, Mr. Ponsot; for Italy, l\llarquis Visconti-Venosta, 
Count Pagliano, Col. Asinari di nernezzo; for Japan, Mr. Ichi-
hasl).i, Mr. Shiratori, Mr. Sugimura. The secretary general, as-
sisted by l\1r. Cresson and 1\ir. Osborne, was present. Mr. Cam-
erlynck was present as interpreter. 
The chairman, 1\:ir. Hughes~ at the opening of the meeting, rec-
ognized Prince Tokugawa. 
Prince Tokugawa said that it 'vas for an unpleasant purpose 
that he arose to say a word. As some of the committee already 
knew, he ·was about to take his leave of the conference; he was 
starting that afternoon on his return journey to Tokyo to re-
sume his responsibilities in Parliament, which had already .con-
vened. 
It was needless for him to say how greatly he appreciated the 
courtesies 'vhich had been accorded to him by all the delegates 
and for their cooperation in the work of the conference. That 
work had already ach:.eved remarkable success and, as was 
known, its full list of accomplishments was not yet completed. 
In bidding to the members of the committee ~dieu, he wished 
to say that he would always remember with gratification and 
pride the unique privilege which he had had of sitting with them 
and 'vould be delighted whenever their and his paths might cross 
again. 
The chairman said he was sure the members of the committee 
would all deeply regret that Prince Tokugawa had to leave them. 
They were indebted to him for h~s cooperation and he might be 
assured of ·their abiding affection and esteem. He was leaving 
the n1ost pleasant memories of his association with them in this 
important work and the contribution that he had made personally 
to the success of their efforts. 
The chairman then suggested that the committee proceed with 
the consideration of the resolution which had been presented wHh 
respect to the abolition of the use of asphyxiating and other 
poisonous gases in warfare. He then read the resolution, as 
follows: 
" The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases 
and all analogous liquids, materials, or devices having been justly 
condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world and a 
prohibition of such use having been declared in treaties to which 
a majority of the civilized po-wers are parties; 
"No\V, to the end that ~this prohibition shall be universally ac-
cepted as a part of international law binding alike the conscience 
and practice of nations, the signatory powers declare their assent 
to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby between them-
selves, and invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto." 
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1\lr. Sarraut said he rose to express his full and frank a ll-
llerence to 1\lr. Root's resolution. Fron1 the first France had con-
demned the barbarous inventions and the abominable practices 
introduced by Germany in the late war and the new methods 
consisting in the use of gases, burning liquids, and poisonous 
substances; the first thing the committee should do was officially 
and solemnly to denounce those who had taken the initiative in 
these things. All present should hope and work for the final dis-
appearance from warfare of these infamous practices if, indeed, 
other wars were to come-a thought which, he said, was abhorent 
to him. 
This mjght,"no doubt, be accomplished by setting an example to 
the other countries. The reports of experts who had maturely 
considered the question had indeed pointed out the extreme diffi-
culty, if not impossibility, of taking practical precautions against 
the threat and the use of these poiso!?- gases and these chemicals. 
It 'vas an established and indisputable fact that those chemicals 
which were used in the manufacture of gases and poisons were 
the san1e that were used for innumerable ordinary substances 
necessary to the industrial and peaceful life of the human race. 
The reports of experts had established the in1possibility of 
exercising an effective supervision over the production of gases 
which might be used as weapons of war and hence the impossi-
bility of preventing or limiting such production. This entailed, 
as a logical consequence, the impossibility of preventing any coun-
try from arming itself in advance against the unfair use of those 
gases which an unscrupulous enemy might secretly prepare for 
sudden use upon an unprotected enemy, as had been clone during 
the late war. 
But, if the exercise of authority in the matter did not at the 
moment appear practicable, the Root resolution was none the l~ss 
a useful accomplishment because, in the first place, it would be· 
a bond of union between the Powers here represented and, fur-
ther, because their agreement and their example might be such 
as to bring about the adherence of all the nations to the same 
principles. It was necessary, indeed, that this adherence should 
be unanimous in order that an effective and salutary result might 
be obtained. But, in the meantime, the conference would have· 
presented a great example possessing a not inconsiderable per-
suasive power, thus possibly preventing the repetition of certain 
atrocities committed by certain belligerents during the late war. 
It was 'vith this lofty and humane motive that the French dele-
gation subscribed with all its heart to the Root resolution. 
l\lr. Balfour said that as he understood the matt~r, the pro-
posal before the meeting was the reaffirmation of the admitted 
_principles of international law. In that sense there was nothing 
new in the proposals made by Mr. Root. Indeed, on the ver;r-
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face of the document itself, it was pointed out that the greater 
number of nations, in the various treaties which they had made 
.subsequent to tile armistice, had explicitly or implicitly declared 
that, in their view, the present proposal was already part of the 
accepted law -of nations. He believed that the United States of 
America, ~vho had not ratified those treaties, had made separate 
treaties; but in those treaties also they had by implication af-
iirmed the present propcsal as part of the general law. Moreover, 
he remembered that in 1\1arch, 1918, a declaration had b-een 
made by all the allied and associated powers, in response to an 
appeal made to them by the Red Cross Society, in which in ex-
plicit terms they had laid down the same doctrine. Behind· all 
those forn1al acts ther~ Ju~_d been the findings of the two Hague 
conferences -\vhich, although so far as he was aware were not 
ratified by the United States of America, were accepted by all 
the other powers engaged in those conferences, undoubtedly with 
the sympathy although not with the explicit ratification of 
America. TLerefore, he supposed he was right in saying that 
t he document before them neither made nor professed to make 
.any change in international" law. 
It would be interesting to compare the procedure on this point 
with that which had been adopted ·with regard to submarines. 
'There also they had declared in very clear terms what they con-
·.ceive to be the law, and what undoubtedly was the law of nations 
as regards attacks on merchant ships by ships of war. In that 
-case they went further than it was now proposed to do, and 
further than it was possible to go now, for they had made an 
alteration and had proposed an extension of the law of nations. 
''They had agreed among themselves t~ be bound by regul~tions 
·which were in advance of the actual law of nations; and they had 
.also altered the sanctions which lay behind the law of nations, in 
that they introduced the fourth of Mr. Root's clauses which would 
-convict the individuals who broke the law as guilty of piracy. So 
that in dealing with submarines they had gone a good deal 
·further than 'vas practicable in the present case. 'rhey could now 
-d0 no more than reaffirm the law. It might be asked in the first case 
what was the use of merely coming forward and reaffirming what 
nobody denied? Personally he thought such a course was im-
portant and valuable, if all the lamentable occurrences of the late 
war and all the developments which that war caused in the use 
·of noxious gases were taken into account. 
Of course, they must all admit, as Mr. Sarraut had well pointed 
-out, that a mere affirmation of the law without adding any sanc-
tions to it would not relieve the nations of the world from taking 
_precautions against those who were prepared to break the law; 
and who, if they were allowed to do so with impunity, might domi-
nate the world by the mere indifference they showed to the laws 
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which the world had endeavored to lay down. That was what 
had actually occurred in 1915. In 1915, as in 1922, the present 
proposal was the law <!f nations; and, because it was the law of 
nations, no nation but one had taken any steps toward using 
noxious gases, or had contemplated as part of their possible mili-
tary operation that such gases should be used either by themselves 
ov by their enem:es. The result had been very near to a complete 
disaster for the Allied armies. The shock of that new weapon of 
warfare had been wholly local, for the invention of science came 
to the rescue, and finally the Allies and their unscrupulous enemy 
fought out the war on equal terms.· That example unhappily 
was now before them and could not be ignored. Their specialists 
had pointed out in Washington, and an examination by a com-
mittee of the League of Nations had brought out a similar re-
sult at Geneva, that it was perfectly impossible so to arrange 
matters that a nation bent upon doing so should not in times of 
peace-whatever the rules of war might be-make such prepara-
tions as would enable it to use that monstrous and inhuman 
method of warfare at its will if war broke out., They knew that 
at least one great civilized nation had not thought it improper, 
or at all events had chosen, whether proper or not, to break the 
law of nations. That wretched example might unhappily be fol-
lowed in the future; and therefore no nation could forget that it 
was open to attack by unscrupulous enemies; no nation therefore 
could forego that duty of examining how such attacks could be 
properly dealt with and effectively met. 
Again there 'vas a par3;llel in the case of the submarine. The 
British Empire delegation had desired to abolish submarines, but 
that was found impossible, and it was admittedly impossible to 
stop the erection of works in which poison gases could be manu-
factured in unlimited quantities. The British Empire delegation 
therefore had to say-and he "\vas sure they had the sympathy 
around that table, for no dissentient voice had been raised-that if 
submarines '\Vere allowed they had to contemplate as a conceivable 
possibility that they would be misused, and that precautions would 
have to be taken against such misuse. He believed that every 
other nation recognized that unhappily submarines would remain 
a necessity as in the case of poison and lethal gases. Therefore 
the relief which such a resolution as this would give to the '\Vorld 
in connection with poison gas would not be the complete relief 
which they all desired ; it would not remove the anxieties and 
preoccupations which the possible use of gas necessarily involves. 
But were they therefore to say that they would do nothing? Were 
tJ1ey therefore to say that resolutions such as that now before 
tllem were useless? Were they therefore to say that it was an 
empty form solemnly to repeat rules which were already accepted, 
25882-23--14 
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although they were not in a position by the establishment of new 
sanctions absolutely to prevent their use by any nation unscrupu-
lous enough to desire to use them? Those questions he would 
answer in the negative. He believed that if by any action of 
theirs on such an occasion as the present they could do something 
to bring home to the consciences of mankind that poison gas was 
not a form of warfare which civilized nations could tolerate, they 
would be doing something important toward discouraging them. 
No sanctions were provided in the present document; no sanc-
tions could be provided there. But if anyone looked back even 
upon the history of the late lamentable war, he would see, notably 
in the great test case of the United States, that the gradual rising 
of public indignation ·against some grossly .immoral use of the 
weapons of vvar had had a profound influence upon the history of. 
the world. He vvas quite sure that the moral indignation roused · 
in the consciences of the United States had had a most powerful 
effect upon the whole trend of events. He thought that by the 
present resolution, backed as it was by the consciences of the 
civilized world, although there was no sanction laid down· in it, for 
no sanction was possible, they 'vould in fact be creating a- sanc-
tion not formally but informally. He beiieved that the outraged 
consciences of the world would rise in indignation and that any 
nation would be very bold and very ill-advised, if, in the face of 
that universal opinion, it deliberately violated the rules vvhich on 
the present occasion they were invited deliberately to affirm. 
Therefore, without committing himself to the actual language of 
the resolution, he most heartily associated himself and also the 
British Empire delegation 'vith the Policy which the American 
delegation, through the mouth of Mr. Root, had put forward for 
their acceptance. 
Admiral Baron Kato said that the question of poison gases.had 
been discussed fully and the opinions in regard to them were now 
very weil known. He would not, therefore, take the committee's 
time by repeating them ; he simply wished to express his ap-
prov.al,. on behalf of the Japanese delegation, of the resolution 
presented by 1\fr. Root. 
The chairman remarked that there seemed to be unanimity in 
support of the resolution and added that, unless further discus-
sion was desired, he would ask for the formal assent of the delega-
tions to the resolution in the form in which he had read it. 
The delegations being polled, each voted affirmatively, and the 
chairman declared it unanimously adopted. 
The chairman said that the next subject presented for the com-
mittee's consideration was the question of limitation of airrraft 
a~ to numhers, character, and use. 
It would he recalled that a subcommittee of experts to dPaJ 
with thiR snbjec~t lHHl been appointed; that commiUee had made a 
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careful, comprehensive, and somewhat voluminous report, which 
had been distributed. In view of the fact that the members of the 
committee all had this report before them, he assumed that it 
would not b~ necessary to read it in extenso.· The question, he con-
tinued, was not presented for discussion; the desire was simply 
to get· the report before the committee for such disposition as 
they might desire; and in order that they might make. a begin-
ning, he would simply refer to some of the main points of the 
report. Whatever time was necessary for its full examination 
and analysis would, of course, be afforded; it was not necessary 
that the committee should proceed with the discussion of it, 
which would not be continued until all the members of the com-
mittee were agreeable to that course. 
Sir Robert Borden said that he would be grateful if the chair-
man would make as full an exposition of the report on the limi-
tation· of aircraft as he was prepared to do. This would serve as 
an introduction of the principal issues and would facilitate the 
general understanding. 
The chairman then briefly outlined, and read 'extracts from, the 
following report : 
" CO:MI\IITTEE ON AIRCRAFT-REPORT ON LIMITATION OF AIRCRAFT AS TO 
NUMBERS, CHARACTE:&, AND USE, 
"1. Fonn of proceclure.-In considering the limitation .of air-
craft as to numbers, character,. and use, the Committee on Air-
craft adopted a form of procedure which took up the various 
questions involved in the following order: (1) Commercial air-
craft; (2) civil aircraft; (3) military aircraft. Heavier-than-air 
and lighter-than-air craft were considered separately, since the 
conditions governing the two are not in all cases the same. An 
effort was made to determine whether or not it is possible to im-
pose limitations upon their (1) number, (2) character, (3) use, 
and after discussion of the methods that might be employed to 
effect such limitation, \vhether limitation was practicable or not. 
This committee feels that the desirability of placing any limita-
tions whatever upon aircraft is a matter of policy, one which it 
is for the main committee itself to determine. Nevertheless, it 
feels it to be a duty to point out the essential facts which will 
hnse a decided bearing upon the determination of the proper policy 
to be adopted, and· this is done in this report. 
"2. C01nrnercial aircraft.-Different methods of imposing such 
limitation may be adopted by different states. The precise 
methods adopted by any state must be in conformity with its 
organic la"\v. In some states it may be possible to impose an. 
arbitrary limitation; in others, by the exercise of the police power, 
or of the power to tax, a practical limitation may be enforced .. 
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In the United States, where laws passed by the Congress must 
conform to the written Constitution of the country, there may be 
some difficulty in finding an effective means of imposing this 
limitation, but nevertheless it is believed that if necessary such 
means can be found. 
"3. Before discussing any other phase of the matter it will be 
well to consider carefully the effects which would follow the 
imposition of the limitation upon the numbers and character of 
commercial aircraft which may be owned and operated by the 
nationals of a state. In the first place, if commercial aeronautics 
is allowed to follow the natural laws which have governed the 
development of all other means of transportation and communica-
tion, the num,ber and character of such aircraft will probably 
depend on financial considerations. That is, commercial aero-
nautics as a business will not thrive unless the operation of the 
aircraft will return a substantial profit. The state may interfere 
with the operation of these natural laws by granting to the 
owners and operators of such aircraft a direct or indirect subsidy . 
. By so doing enterprises which would not otherwise be financially 
successful may be enabled to live and in this way the number of 
ajrcraft used for commercial purposes will be greater than if 
the natural laws of developl?ent had been allowed to take their 
course. 
"It is not easy to foresee what consequences to human progress 
will come in the future from the development of aeronautics. in 
all its branches. They will certainly be marvelous where natural 
conditions are favorable to such development. To try to limit 
them now with arbitrary laws, even if these laws have the 
purpose of p1:eventing war, would be in the opinion of this com-
mittee disastrous from the point of view of world progress. 
"4. If, among commercial aircraft, we class those owned and 
9perated for sport or pleasure or convenience, the numbers of 
these will depend largely upon the wealth of .the nation, upon the 
inclination of the people toward aeronautics, upon the cost of the 
a ircraft thus employed. 
" 5. The development of aircraft has presented the world with 
a new and improved means of transportation and communication. 
One of the causes of warfare in the past has been a lack of the 
proper distribution of the world's resources in raw material, food 
products, and the like. Another potent cause of war has been the 
lack of understanding between races, peoples, and nations. Any 
addition to the transportation and communication facilities of 
the world should operate to improve the distribution of resources 
and likewise to lessen the causes of misunderstandings between 
peoples, and thus lessen the causes of warfare. Any limitation, 
therefore, placed upon comn1ercial aeronautics would haye the 
effect of limiting a means of transportation and communication 
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between the different parts of the smne state and between dif-
ferent states. It seems inconceivable that any limitation should 
be imposed upon commercial aeronautics unless it were with the 
avowed object of thereby limiting the air power of· a state and 
thus decreasing the liability of war. Commercial aeronautics 
with its attendant development of an aeronautical industry and 
a personnel skilled in the manufacture, operation, and the main-
tenance of aircraft does furnish a basis of air power. The 
development of commercial aeronautics and the development of a . 
nation's air power are inseparable. 
"6. Speaking broadly, all aircraft will be of some military value 
no matter what restrictions may be placed upon their character. 
Some can probably be converted with but few changes into military 
aircrafts; others can be designed so that with major or minor 
alterations, or even with none at all, they can be employed for 
military purposes. As a matter of fact, the uses of aircraft in 
war are many. During the vVorld War highly specialized types 
were designed for special uses. Military aircraft have likewise 
been developed to a degree of perfection not yet reached in com-
mercial aircraft. It is quite reasonable to suppose that similar 
development will take place in commercial aircraft, that they, 
too, will be especially designed for the uses to be made of them, 
and that they may depart quite radically from the military types 
used in the vVorld War. 
"In milit.ary aircraft, as a rule, a premium is placed upon per-
formance. Consideration of initial cost and cost of operation and 
of maintenance are largely disregarded. The safety and con-
venience of the operators and passengers are co~sidered only as 
these affect their ability to perform their military duties. If, as 
seems evident, commercial aircraft must be specially designed for 
the service they are to perform in order to have a chance of being 
financially successful, any effort to provide for their conversion 
into military craft will introduce complications which will in-
crease the cost of production and operation. This may itself auto-
matically act as a limitation, for business enterprises will not be 
willing to have such conditions imposed unless they are compen-
sated in some way for the extra cost. 
"7. Heavier-than-air.-The war value of an airplane may be 
said to lie in a combination of two or more of the following char-
acteristics : 
" (a) Its suitability for offensive and defensive equipment. 
" (b) Its radius of action. 
" (c) Its speed. 
"-(d) Its carrying capacity. 
" (e) The height it can attain. 
"It is not desired to go too deeply into technical matters in this 
report. The committee wishes, however, to point out that the 
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peace value of aircraft is at present intimately bound up with the 
general characteristics which make up the value of the airplane 
in war. The last four of the characteristics enumerated above are 
dependent upon the relation between the amount of fuel carried, 
the horsepower of the engine, the lifting surface, and the total 
'veight. The committee is of the opinion that formulae could be 
evolved defining the inter-relationship of these factors in such a 
way as to limit the war value of the machine built in conformity 
therewith. It is more difficult to insure that war equipment 
shall not be mounted in a commercial airplane. In this nwtter 
the committee is of the opinion that definite rules can not be laid 
down. 
"Radius of actio'n is of high commercial value. A reliable air 
service from Europe to America in, say 24 hours, should prove a 
highly profitable undertaking. Again, in countries where there 
is perhaps the greatest scope for the development of airways, 
countries of great deserts for example, radius of action is es-
sential. Speed is plainly the characteristic on which aircraft 
rely to gain advantage in their competition with other means of 
transportation." It is not yet comfort and security but time-
saving that will tempt passengers, mail, and valuable cargoes from 
old established services. To limit speed is to stop progress, to 
throttle aviation in its infancy. 
"The power of carrying numbers of passengers or quantities of 
goods is of obvious commercial value and even the attainment of 
considerable heights may eventually be a definite requirement. 
As a matter of fact the success of recent experiments ind_icates 
that, with special means of supercharging motors, navigation of 
tLe air will in the future utilize high regions of the atmosphere 
to take advantage of less resistance of the air and of favorable 
high velocity winds. 
"The factors which comprise' military' performance have there-
fore, a high commercial value, and it is the opinion of this com-
mittee that any limitation of the character of civil and commercial 
aircraft must hinder the natural development of aviation; it is 
probable that restriction as to character will have, in fact, an 
even more adverse reaction on the progress of aviation than \Vould 
be caused by a restriction on numbers. 
"8. ll!ethod of limitation.-Aircraft can be limited as to num-
ber and character by an agreement arbitrarily fixing a maximum 
number for each nation that will not be exceeded and by imposing 
technical restrictions in such a way as to limit performance. 
"9. The difference in organic· law as between nations will 
probably prevent a single system of limitation being of universal 
application. l\1oreover, the rules of formulre, whereby alone the 
character of civil and commercial aircraft can be limited, must 
be detailed and stringent. At the same time, they will be easy 
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to evade, and infringement will not be obvious to the casual 
glance. l\1easurements of horsepower, supporting surface, fuel 
capacity, and weight will be necessary if security against eva-
sion is to be insured by any other means than by trusting to the 
good faith of the contracting parties. No State could consent to 
having the nationals of another power continually inspecting all 
of its manufacturing plants in order to ascertain whether the 
l:!nitations it imposed we.::e being enforced. 
"All these points received the closest of consideration with 
reference to the limitation of Germany's airpower and the matter 
is so complicated that the final drafting of the technical rules has 
not yet been completed. But taking rules as drafted and even 
assuming continuous inspection of a most stringent character, 
it appears that there ar_e still loopholes for evasion. No rules 
can prevent aircraft being designed in peace to permit of the 
ready installment of larger tanks in war; engines can be made in-
terchangeable, enabling one of higher power to be rapidly in-
stalled ; even carrying surface can be increased by the standard-
ization and interchangeability of '\Vings and other methods, and 
it is not impossible to conceive of civil and commercial aircraft 
be~ng designed with a view to ultimate war requirements. 
" 10. For the above reason, the committee is agreed that in the 
present stage of development of aviation a universal limitation 
by formul& of the character of commercial aircraft is impracti-
cable. 
"11. Question of subsidy.-Without expressing an opinion as 
to the desirability of abolishing subsidies for the encouragement 
of comn1ercial aviation, the committee points out that such 
subsidies, direct or indirect, can have a great influence on the 
character and number of commercial aircraft in relation to their 
war value. In fact, subsidies will tend to decrease the natural 
divergence between military and commercial aircraft and render 
·the latter more readily ~daptable to war us~s. It is necessary, 
ho·wever, to add that indirect subsidies or other encouragement 
are most difficult to prevent, and even when acting in good faith 
Governments of different nations will place clifferen t in terpreta-
tions on such encouragement. 
"The question of wl:ether SlJ.bSidies are granted or not will 
have great bearing upon development of commercial aircraft in 
general, and ·will affect the future welfare of the nations. This 
question, therefore, can not be determined frmn the point of view 
solely of the adaptability for war uses. 
"12. Civil aircraft.-In this discussion a distinction is drawn 
tetweea commercial aircraft and clvil aircraft; the latter wlll 
comp1·ise all aircrJ.ft operated by a State except those which it 
or)erates in connection ·with its military enterprises. Oivil air-
CI"aft will, therefore, include ·any which are State-operated in 
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t he customs service, for transporting the mails, the exercise of 
its police powers, and the like. It is readily apparent that as 
aircraft operate in a medium where there are no physical bar-
riers, they can compete in some measure with every means of 
transportation used on land or water. It !s therefore possible 
for much of the transportation requirements of any State to 
be met by the operation of aircraft. Such aircraft manifestly 
are not dependent for their being upon their ability to be oper-
ated at a profit. The State will decide how best it may enforce 
its laws, exercise its police power, transport State-o\vned mer-
chandise or mails, and the means used will be those which are 
most efficient and most economical from the standpoint of the 
State itself. The cheapest ·will not always be the best or the most 
satisfactory. 
" The number. and the legitimate use of aircraft by any Gov-
ernment for such civil purposes will, therefore,. be limited only 
by the estimate. placed upon the service which they can render 
and by the consent of the people to raising by taxation the amount 
of money which must be employed for their acquirement, opera-
t ion, and maintenance. 
" 13. If the civil agencies of a State use aircraft for police or 
other purposes that are essentially military in · character this 
class ·of civil aircraft should be discussed under the limitation 
of military aircraft. 
"14. The number and character of such civil aircraft can be 
limited only by an arbitrary agreement among the States. 
" 15. It ·would, ·again, be utterly impracticable to set up any 
agency acting under authority other than that of a nation itself 
to regulate the number of civil aircraft o·wned and operated by 
the State. 
LIGHTER-THAN-AIR CRAFT. 
"16. Limitation of number and · character."""-The character-
istics of lighter-than-air craft are sucl'l. that limitation of num-
ber and character presents little technical or practical difficulty. 
It is a peculiarity of these craft that their effidency is very in-
timately bound up in their size. Small dirigibles have a war 
value of their own, but it is limited and they can not be con-
sidered as offensive weapons. For example, a small vessel of this 
kind can not attain any considerable height while carrying a 
useful load, and even if filled with noninflammable gas its vul-
nerability to gunfire at the heights it could reach preclude its 
being utilized for such purposes as aerial bombardment. Only 
in large-size-d dirigibles can a useful load be carried to a reason-
able military height at a fair speed. Limitation of size is there-
fore su!ficient to insure that lighter-than-air craft should be in-
capable of offensive aerial action. Moreover, the construction of 
LI l\IITATIO~ OF USE. 209 
large dirigibles requires large sh~d accommodation and can not 
be kept secret; in this respect they resemble surface warships. 
"17. It is therefore possible to regulate their numbers and 
size by a simple system of international agreement, and infringe-
ment of such agreement can be readily detected without a de-
tailed system of control. 
"18. The committee is agreed that the possibilities of war use 
for large dirigibles may still exist. AI though in the Ia ter stages 
of the 'Vorld War it appeared as if the defense had the mastery 
over attack in lighter-than-air craft, the introduction of larger 
craft filled with noninflammable gas and carrying their own pro-
tective aeroplanes may again permit bombardments being carried 
out by dirigibles. 
"This committee desires, however, to draw attention to the 
fact that dirigibles become increasingly efficient with increase of 
size. Any limit which is imposed on the size of commercial diri-
gibles must shut the door on the possibility of their development 
for legitimate civil enterprises. 
" 19. Lin~itation of the use of aircraft.-The co'mmittee· is of the 
opinion that it wo-uld be useless to attempt to lay down a rule 
that civil and· commercial aircraft should not be us~d in war, as 
they consider that no nation could deny itself the value for war 
purposes of their commercial machines provided that they are 
suitable for any warlike purposes. It is understood that when 
so used they will be manned by service personnel of the State 
and carry the proper distinguishing marks, and will in fact be-
come war aircraft ; their use does not therefore require discus-
sion in this part of the committee report. 
"20. The use of civil and commercial aircraft in peace is gov-
erned by the International Air Convention, which amply safe-
guards a State's sovereignty in the air against abuse. 
"21. This conv~ntion has already been ratified by Great Brit-
ain, France, Japan, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Serb-Croat and 
Slovene State, and Siam. It will at a very near date come into 
force for these various powers and later for the other signatory 
States and also nonsignatory powers who desire to adhere to it. 
"22. The committee is aware, however, that ·for certain reasons 
the United States has not yet announced its adherence to this 
convention. The committee therefore suggests for the considera-
tion of the subcommittee on program and procedure that a con-
vention covering the different phases of aerial navigation and 
based upon the one ment:oned above could be drawn up at this 
conference to which the assent of all powers represented could 
be glYen. ~rhe committee further belieYe that this is most 
desirable. 
21.0 l\IILITARY AIRCRAI!'T. 
" SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS. 
"23. Civil and conunercial aircraft.-This committee under-
stands that •the purpose of t"tlis conference is to promote peace and 
to remove the causes of ·warfare. It must be understood dis-
tinctly that if the conference decided to limit the development of 
commercial aircraft in order to retard the development of air 
power the immediate result will be the retarded development of 
means of transportation and communicntion, 'vhich will itself, if 
unrestricted, largely act to bring about the same result, the 
removal of some of the causes of warfare. 
"24. This committee is unanimously of the opinion that in the 
present state of development of aeronautics there is a technical 
possibility of the limitation of numbers, character, and use of 
civil and commercial aireraft with regard to their utilization in 
war; they are,· however, agreed that such limitation of numbers, 
and especially of character, is not practicable, except in the case 
of lighter-than-air craft of above a certa:n displacement. 
"25. As regards the desirability of limitations, the committee 
has touched on those factors which must be understood before 
arriving at a decision. It feels it to be a duty to lay great stress 
upon the follo·wing fact, which ·will have a decided bearing upon 
any determination of the proper policy to be adopted: Any limita-
tion as to number and character of civil and commercial aircraft, 
heavier than air or lighter than air, which is efficacious to hinder 
their utility for war purposes must interfere disastrously with 
the natural development of aeronautics for legitimate civil and 
commercial enterprises. To limit the science of aeronautics in its 
present state is to shut the door on progress. It is for the con-
ference to decide whether the limitations ·which can with diffi-
eulty be devised and imposed are to. be adopted at Sl!Ch a cost. 
"Military aircratt.-(Note. In the part of the report 'vhich fol-
lows the word 'military ' is used in its widest sense to denote 
' pertaining to the fighting services, whether :naval, military, or 
air.') 
"26. Prelim"inary remarks.-The committee agreed that before 
·entering upon a discussion of possible limitation of the numbers 
of military aircraft it was desirable ·that the present relative 
strength of the nations represented should be ascertained and 
tabulated in a simple form designated to fac:litate comparison 
between them. The results 'of this inyestigation are tabulated in 
appendixes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, attached to this report. It is remarked 
that though these forins afford· a guide to the relative military 
air strengths at the present day, it is impracticable to present a 
complete estimate of a nation's air power, since air power is (as 
bas been already shown) intimately bound up in factors other 
than the military establishment. Differences in organizat:on and 
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administration of the ·various national aerial forces are a further 
obstacle to dir(?ct comparison in detail ; these factors must not be 
forgotten when studying the statement presented and must be 
kept in the foreground of all discussions as to the possibility of 
limitation. 
"27. As to number.-The limitation of the number of military 
aircraft presents from one point of view less difficulty than the 
similar problem in the case of commercial aircraft. It is obvious 
that if a limitation on the number of military aircraft is agreed 
upon between nations, it can be imposed by a state withou·t that 
interference with the liberty of citizens which compl~cates the 
question of aircraft devoted to commercial pursuits. But when 
the details of such an agreement are considered, it will be found 
a matter of great difficulty to find a reasonable basis on which 
the allotment of relative strengths cai1 be made. For example: · 
"(i) The 'status quo' cannot serve as a starting point, since 
the state of development of air services differs widely in the case 
of the various pO'iYers (see appendixes), and in no case can these 
services be considered as complete. . 
"(ii) The size of a nation's navy and army will influence the 
hasis, in so far as aircraft are essential auxiliaries to those 
services. 
" (iii) National p·olicy will differ as between nations: some na-
tiO:QS, for example, will wish to have large air forces for coast 
defence where others prefer to trust to older methods. Develop-
ment on the lines of the substitution of air forces for other forms 
of force are likely to be considerable. 
"(iv) The potentialities of air forces in policing and garrisoning 
semicivilized countries or uncivilized countries, are as yet only 
partially realized. The number of aircraft required for such 
duties will vary with the size and nature of the territories to be 
patrolled and with the value placed on their services by different 
nations. 
"(v) The geographical position and peculiarities of a state, the 
situation and strength of its possible enen1ies, and the nature of a 
possible attack must influence the number of aircraft it will desire 
to maintain. 
"(vi) Different terms of. service for personnel will influence the 
effectiveness of air services and the size of the reserve. 
" (vii) The state of development or possibilities for civil aero-
nautics will have, as has been shown above, a direct bearing on the 
number of military aircraft which it may be desirable for a state 
to maintain. 
"The problem of finding a suitable ratio between the air forces 
of various powers is thus at the present time almost insuperable. 
"28. As to character.-But eYen should it lJe possible to fix the 
ratio, such a limitation would be of little value without some lin1it 
•• 
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as to the character of the aircraft. Whe:p the question of limita-
tion of naval armaments was considered by the conference it was 
found necessary to limit the displacement of individual ships as 
well as the total tonnage. In the absence of similar provision the 
limitation of numbers of aircraft would only result in competitive 
building of aircraft of greater and greater power and size. The 
methods of limitation must therefore attempt to legislate for both 
number and character. 
"HEAVIER-THAN-AIR. 
"29. :JI etlwds of limitation.-The following methods may be 
employed: 
"First. The limitation of the number of military aircraft. 
"Second. The limitation of the amount of horsepower for mili-
tary aircraft. 
"Third. The limitation of the lift tonnage for military aircraft. 
"Fourth. The limitation of personnel for military aircraft. 
"Fifth. The limitation of military aircraft budgets. 
" These five methods may be applied in combination or singly 
and are considered in detail below : 
"30. Limitation of the number of aircraft is the most obvious 
method of limiting the strength of the aviation force, but in at-
tempting to apply this method the question of size and type at 
once arises. It might be necessary to limit the maximum wing 
surface permitted to a single aircraft or it might be necessary 
to prescribe the number of aircraft in each of the type groups, 
such as combat planes, bombing planes, etc.; this question of de-
finition of type presents great difficulty. In order to make an 
effective limitation of the numbers of military aircraft to be main-
tained in peace time by any nation, it will be necessary to have 
a detailed understanding on the following points: 
"(1) On the number and types actually in use by organized 
. aerial units. 
" (2) On the number and types held in reserve. 
"(3) On the number and type of engines held in reserve. 
" ( 4) On the replacement of planes crashed, worn out, or re-
placed by later models. In the case of obsolete and other planes 
that are replaced by other models it would be necessary to enter 
into an agreement regarding the disposal of planes so replaced. 
Otherwise it would be possible to build up an unlimited war re-
serve merely by classifying the plane~ so held as obsolete, or by 
converting them into civil or commercial planes. 
"(5) On the limitation of the ·adoption of new and more power-
ful types. 
"All these points will present great difficulty in an age when 
aircraft can become obsolete in a few months, and when their 
; 
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nature is such that war wastage may be as high as 200 per cent 
per month. 
"31. The second n1ethod of limitation, limitation of horsepower, 
may apply to: 
" ( 1) Total horsepower in assembled planes. 
"(2) Total horsepower in assembled engines. 
"(3) Horsepower in a single fndividual plane of a given type. 
".This can only be based on the cubic capacity of the engines; 
there will be no guaranty that a nation has not discovered a secret 
which will enable greater horsepower to be got out of limited 
capacity, nor is it reasonable to expect any nation to disclose such 
a secret. The more detailed the limitation the greater the admin-
istrative difficulty of enforcement, particularly under present con-
ditions, when administrative methods are so widely different, and, 
as pointed out in the first part of the report, any enforcement, to 
be effectual, would entail such detailed inspection by a fore:gn 
commission as to be intolerable to any nation. 
" 32. The third method of limitation, limitation of lift tonnage, 
may apply to : 
" ( 1) Total lift tonnage in assembled planes . 
• " ( 2) Total lift tonnage in all planes assembled or not as-
sembled. 
"(3) Lift tonnage of a single individual plane of a given type. 
"Any method must presumably be based 0n wing area and horse-
po\ver. It has been mentioned that the actual horsepower may be 
unkno\vn, and it is likewise conceivable that a nation may discover 
a wing shape of extreme lifting efficiency and neglect to disclose 
the fact. Limitation of lift tonnage may therefore be wholly 
illusory, and the remarks as to inspection made in the last para-
graph apply to this method also. 
"33. The fourth method of limitation, whether of the total or 
organized personnel for war aircraft or only of pilots in the per-
manent mil~tary establishment, fails by reason of the difference in 
organization between different states. A nation which has a sepa-
rate air service has to include in its organized personnel those em-
ployed in recruiting, supply, transport, administrative headquar-
ters; etc. In the case of nations whose air forces are, contained 
in their naval and military forces, supply, etc., personnel are in-
cluded in naval and military establishments; a fair comparison 
can not therefore be made. Moreover, the difference in terms of 
service, long or short, voluntary service or conscription, must 
introduce incalculable factors which directly affect the efficiency 
of organized air forces and the size and efficiency of the reserve. 
"34. The fifth method of limitation, limitation by means of 
limiting the budget and thereby controlling the amount of money 
that may be expended annually for aviation, seems simple in 
theory, but it is difficult of application. The various methods of 
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distributing budgets for material under different subheads make it 
impracticable to determine or compare the actual sums expended 
exclusively for aircraft, and the question is at present further 
complicated by the factor of the relative purchasing power of the 
currency of various nations. 
"35. Of the five methods of limitation, limitation by lift ton-
nage or horsepower appears to pr~sent the least objections ; _but to 
make these or any other methods effective, it ·would be necessary, 
as previously. pointed out, to organize a system of international 
inspections. Any system of international inspection would oe 
almost certain to arouse ill-feeling and would tend to cause fric-
tion rather than to insure harmony and good feeling between 
friendly powers. 
"36. Impracticability of limitation of nu1nber and character.-
Objections in detail to each suggested method of .limitation have· 
been advanced above-there is one insuperable objection which is 
common to every method,_ namely, the close relationship which at 
present exists between civil or commercial aeronautics and air 
power. Unless civil and commercial aeronautics are strictly 
limited-and it has been shown in the early par~ of this report 
that it is not practicable to limit them-a nation desiring air 
power in excess of the limit imposed or agreed to will develop its 
civil and commercial aeronautics to any extent desired. 
"Granting a flourishing aeronautical industry, the number of the· 
present type of perishable military airplanes active on any given 
date is only one of the elements of air power. During the war a 
single American firm contracted to - deliver 100 aircraft a day,. 
and the output of engines can be organized on a similar scale. 
A nation's air po,ver can thus be multiplied not only by the actual 
number of civil and commercial aircraft in ·use but also by the 
capacity of the industry to turn to the manufacture of military 
aircraft in large quantities. Limitation of the number of horse-
power and lift tonnage would under such conditions prove· 
illusory. This commercial industry will further provide a great 
potential reserve of pilots and skilled technical personnel and will 
thus discount to a great extent any limitation of numbers of the· 
personnel of military aviation. 
"37. It is the opinion of this committee that the limitation 
of n1ilitary air povirer (as regards heavier-than-air craft) is not 
practicable at the present time. Their reasons for this decision 
are as follows: 
" (I) The difficulty of finding a basis for the proportion of air ... 
craft to ·be allotted to the various nations. 
· " (II) The difficulty of devising technical methods to irr:lJ;)Ose-
such limitation. 
" (III) The difficulty of enforcing such methods. 
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" ( l V) The interdependence between air power and a com-
mercial aircraft industry which it is not practicable to limit. 
"38. Lighter-than-air cratt.-Many of the remarks already 
made apply to lighter-than-air craft but, as in the case of com-
mercial aircraft of this nature, limitation is both possible and 
practicable. It is unnecessary to recapitulate the argument that 
the military value of a dirigible is dependent on its size, and the 
size of dirigibles and the number maintained can be limited by 
agreement of a few simple rules.· Infraction of such rules can 
be rapidly ascertained without detailed inspection. But such a 
limitation of lighter-than-air aviation forces would not effect a 
limitation of this kind of air power of a nation unless a limita-
tion were also imposed on- its lighter-than-air commercial activi-
ties. The line of demarcation between the large commercial 
airship and the military airship is very slight, and a commercial 
dirigible would require little, if any, alteration in order to adapt 
it to military purposes. The objections to the limitation of the 
number or character of commercial lighter-than-air craft have 
already been remarked on. 
"The question of the use of military aircraft. 
"39. It is necessary in the interests of humanity and to lessen 
the chances of international friction that the rules which should 
govern the use of aircraft in war. should be codified and be made 
the subject of international agreement. 
"40. The matter has been considered by this committee in con-
nection with a draft code of "Rules for Aircraft in War" sub-
mitted for remarks by the committee on the laws of war. The 
subject appears to the committee to be one of extreme importance 
and oiie which raises far-reaching problems, legal, political, com-
mercial, and military; it requires, therefore, exhaustive discus-
sion by a single committee in which experts on all these issues are 
assembled. 
"The representatives of the United States and Japan on this 
committee are prepared to discuss the rules submitted from a. 
technical point of view as provided for in the agenda under para-
graph on limitation of new types of military arms, but the repre-
sentatives of Great Britain, France, and Italy are not so prepared. 
They state that the time between receipt of the agenda for the 
conference and their date of sailing has not permitted that ex-
haustive discussion of the subject that would enable them to 
advance a national viewpoint on a matter which affects so many 
and varied interests. In some cases the national policy has not 
yet been determined. 
"41. This committee recommends therefore that the question of 
the rules for aircraft in war be not considered at a conference 
in which all the members are not prepared to discuss so large 
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a subject, but that the matter be postponed to a further confer-
ence 'vhich it is recommended be assembled for the purpose at a 
date and place to be agreed upon through diplomatic channels. 
" SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS ARRIVED AT BY THE COMMITTEE ON NUM-
BER, CHARACTER, AND USE OF AIRCRAFT. 
"42. The commitfee are agreed that among the more important 
elements which influence the power that a nation may exert by 
means of aircraft are the following : 
"(1) The adaptability of its people to aeronautics. 
"(2) Geographic location and characteristics of the territory 
occupied by the nation and its dependencies. 
" ( 3) The ability to produce and maintain aircraft and acces-
sories. 
" ( 4) The amount and character of aeronautical activity outside 
the military establishment, such as commercial and civil aero-
nautical activities, and sport and pleasure flying. 
" ( 5) The size and efficiency of its air establishment for 
military purposes, consisting of (a) the active establishment, 
including permanent headquarters, bureaus, squadrons, schools, 
technical establishments, depots of material and personnel, etc.; 
(b) the reserve establishment, including organized and unor-
ganized reserve personnel and war reserve of material. 
"43. (1) The adaptability of a nation to aeronautics. 
"Interest of the general public in aeronautics seems to be 
inherent in some nations; in others it is dormant or almost 
lacking. The confidence of a people in aeronautics in general is 
undoubtedly a factor worthy of serious consideration when 
estimating the air power of that country. It ls possible that a 
far-seeing Government may stimulate the interest of its general 
public in aeronautics by exhibitions, general educational meas-
ures, and by the encouragement in a finandal way of individuals 
already interested, and thus increase the adaptability of its 
people to aeronautics. 
"44. (2) Geographic location and characteristics of the terri-
tory occupied by the national and its dependencies. 
" This may be looked on as clos~ly akin to ( 1) . The physical 
characteristics of a country will have a considerable influence on 
the attitude taken by its inhabitants toward aviation. It is 
obvious that, while government action may improve the natural 
character.istics of a country to a certain degree, by making aero-
domes, etc., it is not possible for any limitation of such action 
to be made except by limiting the total amount spent by the 
nation on aviation, a method \vhich has already been shown 
to be largely ineffective. 
"45. (3) The ability to produce and maintain aircraft and 
accessories. 
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"The maximum aeronautical industry possible for a nation to 
build up under ideal conditions is determined by (1) the extent to 
which manufacturing in general is carried on; (2) by the character 
of articles manufactured; (3) by the manufacturing methods in 
general-that is, whether articles are manufactured. by machinery 
or by hand; ( 4) the supply and availability of essential raw 
materials. In the manufacture of many articles the raw materials 
used and the manufacturing methods are similar to those em-
ployed in the manufac'h1re of aircraft and accessories. The 
amount of this class of manufacturing carried on in any country 
is an e3sential factor in estimating the ability of a nation to 
produce aircraft. 
" The ability to expand an existing aeronautical in,dustry rap-
idly enough to meet war conditions is one of the most important 
elements of air po,Yer. This may be estimated by (1) the num-
ber of individuals skilled in the manufacture of air craft and 
accessories; (2) the number of ·individuals whose training in 
industries similar to the aeronautical industry·~fonns a basis for 
learning readily and rapidly the special problems encountered in 
the manufacture of aircraft and accessories; (3) the size and 
condition of the existing aeronautical industries and the size 
and numl1er of manufacturing COl1cerns that can readily be con-
verted to the manufacture of aircraft and accessories; ( 4) the 
existence of a definite program previously determined upon and 
the extent to which orders have been previously placed in an-
ticipation of an emergency with a consequent perfection of plans; 
(5) the amount and state of availability of the essential raw 
materials; (6) tl~e quantity of available jigs, tools, dies, and pro-
duction drawings for going into quantity production of standard 
equipment. 
"46. ( 4) The amount and character of aeronautical activity 
outside the military establishment has been exhaustively dis-
cussed under the limitation of ciYil and commercial aircraft. It 
has been shown that this is intimately bound up with (1) (~) 
and (3), as above, and that, 'vith the exception of lighter-than-
air craft of above a certain size, it is not practicable to limit it 
except perhaps by limiting the amount of subsidies to commercial 
aviation, a method which has been shown to be difficult of ap-
plication and to be otherwise objectionable. It has also been 
shown that the limitation of lighter-than-air craft would have 
a disastrous effect on aviation. 
"47. (5) Existing establishment of aircraft used for n1ilitary 
purposes and the reserve. 
" The size of the organized reserve will depend upon the size 
of the military establishment and the rate at which the menl-
ber~ of the military establishment are trained and returned to 
25882-23-' -1:) 
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civil pursuits. Any reduction in the permanent peace-time estab-
lishment will carry with it a consequent reduction in organized 
and trained reserves. There is, however, a type of personnel 
whose civil pursuits fit them for immediate service in the air 
establishment. This class is 1nade up by those engaged in com-
mercial and civil aeronautics and industrial pursuits which re-
quire the same trades and basic knowledge and experience as is 
required in the operation and maintenan ... ce of military aircraft. 
This class will not be seriously affected by any change in the 
military estabJishment. 
"48. Technical considerations have led the committee to the 
conclusion that the limitation of the fifth element, namely, the 
size and efficiency of peace-time air establishments for military 
purposes (including the active establishment and the organized 
reserve), although theoretically possible, is not practicable. The 
committee also desires to lay stress on the fact that, even if such 
limitation was pr~!ticable, · it would not prevent the use of air 
power in war, but~ould only operate to give greater comparative 
importance to the other elements of s.ir power which can not be 
limited for the reasons given in the report. 
"FINAL CONCLUSION. • 
"Nun~lJer and character.-The committee is of the op1n1on that 
it is not practicable to impose any effective limitations upon the 
numbers or characteristics of aircraft, either commercial or mili-
tary, excepting in the single case of lighter-than-air craft. 
"Use.-The committee is of the opinion that the use of aircraft 
in war should be governed by the rules of warfare as adapted to 
aircraft by a ful'ther conference which should be held at a later 
date. 
"Respectfully submitted by committee on aircraft. 
" For the United States of America: 
. 
"WILLIAM A. l\r1oFFETT, Chairman, 
"Rear Admiral, United States Navy. 
" MASON J\:1. pATRICK, 
"Major General, United States Army. 
" For the British Empire: 
" For France : 
" For Italy : 
" For Japan: 
" J. F. A. HIGGINS, 
''Air Vice Marshal, R. A. F. 
"ALBERT RoPER, Capitaine, 
"Pilot Aviateur, French Army. 
" RICCARDO Morzo, 
' .'-
" Colonel, R. I . A. 
" 0SAMI NAGANO, 
" Captain, I. J. N. 
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"NoTE.-The Italian representative lwlieves anu desires to 
place on record that one way in which it would be possible to 
limit the air power of a nation would be by placing a limit upon 
the number of pilots in the permanent military establishment and 
consequently agrees with tlle general reasoning of the report in 
so far as is not contrary to this opinion. 
" (Signed) Cor.... R. Mo1zo, 
" RICCARDO MoziO, 
"Colonel, R. I. A." 
'•':1 
The chairman sa:d that the report was now before the com-
mittee for such action as might be deemed advisable. 
l\fr. San·aut said that the report would have to be translated, 
and the reading of it alone would take some time; the subject 
was not on the agenda. lie believed that he voiced the opinion 
of llis colleagues on the committee as well as h:s own in saying 
that under the conditions it would be advisable to afford time for 
the necessary examination of the contents of the report. 
I 
The chairman said that, in view of the very short time there had 
been for the ~xamination of the voluminous report, he thought 
that abundant time should be given for its consideration; he had 
taken it up that morning merely because other subjects had been 
disposed of, and he thought that even a general statement might 
aid the committee in making progress with its work. He was 
not aware that the committee was prepared to take up another 
matter at that time, and he therefore suggested that, if that was 
agreeable to the committee, adjournment be taken until Monday. 
Lord Lee asked whether the chairman would give some indica-
tion of what subject would. be discussed after the report on air-
craft; from present indications the consideration of this report 
would take only a short time, and the British delegation would 
like to be prepared for what was to follow. 
'l'he chairman said that three subcommittees had been appointed, 
one on gas, one on aircraft, and one on rules for the conduct of 
Yrar. The committee had dealt with the report on gas and adopted 
a resolution; it had had before it the report on aircraft. He 
understood that the subcommittee on rules of war believed that 
it \vould be impracticable, at this conference, to do more than 
suggest that these should be careful.ly examined and made the 
subject of consideration at another conference. If that was the 
sense of the conference, anu no extended examination of the ques-
tion was to be made, he supposed that the next order of business 
would be the consideration of the report of the details of the pro-
posed naval treaty, with respect to all the matters which were 
then engaging the attention of the naval experts and the legal 
experts. He was unable to say whether that would be ready for 
the next session or not. He assumed that it was the next topic 
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to be taken up, if it 'vas decided not to discuss rules for the con-
duct of war. 
Mr. Balfour said that he had listened with great satisfaction to 
Mr. Hughes's observations on the report. As concerned a general 
revision of the rules of warfare, he said he was afraid he must dis-
courage any attempt to deal with that tremendQus subject. He 
was in some doubt as to whether it came within the list of sub-
jects which his Government had authorized him to discuss; but 
however this n1ight be, he thought that all his colleagues would 
ce wise to limit their ambitions in this direction as close~y as 
he did. 
Sir Robert Borden said he had been much impressed with the 
suggestion of Lord Lee on a l)revious occasion that, should another 
great war break out, questions raised by the illegal use of subma-
rines might arise concerning the use of aircraft in connection with 
the search, seizure, and capt.ure of merchant vessels. Sir Robert 
Borden merely wished to remind his colleagues of this point with-
out even suggesting that it should be considered by this conference. 
But the subject was, in one sense, connected with the conditions 
under which merchant ships might be ordered to stop and might 
be searched, seized, and eYentually captured. This might be done 
b;v aircraft in the next war; in the last war it had been governed 
by the rules as they were then understood, which had not been 
II 
conformed to "-by one nation. If no principles were formulated, 
the powers _might be confronted 'vith the same problems with 
I"espect to aircraft. 
Lord Lee said that he was well aware of the importance of the 
point raised by Sir Robert Borden and that, in fact, it was the 
point he himself had brought to the notice of the conference. He 
supposed, how~ver, that it would be in order for it to come under 
the second of the final conclusions of the report on the limitation 
of aircraft. If this conclusion should be accepted by the com-
mitte~, as Lord Lee assun1ed it probably would be, then the matter 
would go over to the further conference suggested therein-a 
course which he would not oppose. 
Senator Schanzer said he desired to add a few words in the 
same connection as those of Sir Robert Borden. The conclusion 
reached by the subcommittee of experts was that the conference 
should not attempt to fix rules ·for aircraft, and that this question 
should be referrep to a future conference. He had at the present 
time no formal proposition to present, but he thought the matter 
ought to be discussed. He was_ entirely in accord with Mr. Bal-
four, that the conference should_ not attempt to pass on the vast 
subject of the laws of war, as time did not permit of this; but it 
was impossible not to consider the fact that certain laws previ-
ously made-such as those contained in Mr. Root's resolutions re-
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garding submarines-had been reaffirmed at this conferen<:e; in 
the same resolutions the powers represented on the committee had 
stigmatized the abuses of the submarine and ha<l e3tabl shed Hrrnc-
tions. It was impossible to forget the excesses committed by 
military means by the bombardm"ent of open towns "'in Italy dur-
ing the recent war. This had been forbidden by The Hague con-
vention and, just as the com.mittee had thought it necessary to 
condemn excesses committed in connection with submarine war-
fare, would it not be helpful to condemn the excesses committed 
in connection with the bombing of open towns? He did not 
knc'v whether it was proper to suggest such a proposition at that 
time, but he thought that there should be a discussion of the 
matter for t]1e purpose of ascer~aining whether a resolution for-
bidding the bombardment from the air of open towns and villages 
could not be formulated . 
. TLe chairman said that if it were proposed to discuss the ques-
tion of rules of war, except possibly in a very limited sphere, the 
committee would enter upon a field which, he assumed, would 
give it a great deal of concern and would require prolonged study 
and discussion. He did not suggest that the committee ·should 
not enter upon that field if the delegates desired that these sub-
jects should be taken up. He supposed that the report on air-
craft could be dealt 'vith, in its main features, in a comparatively 
short time. The report was voluminous, but that very fact led 
to an easy c9mprehension of the recommendations. If it was 
desired, in connection with the use of aircraft-for example, in 
relation to merchant ships and undefended towns-to bring for-
ward specific resolutions, there would be opportunity to do so. 
He suggested, however, that the committee adjourn until Mon-
day at 11 o'clock, and that it then proceed with the discussion 
o:( the aircraft report. If anything else was ready, when that 
had been disposed of, the committee would take it up. 
The committee then adjourned until Monday, January 9, 1922, 
at 11 o'clck a. m. 
EIGHTEENTH MEETING-MONDAY, JANUARY 9, 1922, 11 A. M. 
PRESENT. 
United States.-~1r. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator 
Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by 
l\Ir. 'Vright, ~1r. Clark. 
British Empire.-l\1r. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, 
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), 
Senator Pearce (fo·r Australia), Mr. Sastri (for India). Accom-
pan:ed by Sir ~Ia urice Hankey, Air l\1arshal Higgins, Capt. Dom-
vile, ~1r. l\1aJkin, ~Ir. Flint, l\1r. Christie. 
